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HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY 
Cultural Absolutism and the 
Nostalgia for Community 
Rhoda E. Howard 
I. CULTURAL RELATIVISM ASCULTURAL ABSOLUTISM 
In recent years the liberal approach to human rights has undergone a two- 
fold assault, from both the right and the left. From the right, liberal human 
rights are attacked by a new version of communalism that promotes the 
integrative protection of the human being in the community as against the 
socially alienating effects of individual human rights. From the left, liberalism 
is attacked by a collectivist approach to human rights based on notions of 
ascriptively-based privileges or disadvantages in society. In the international 
debates on the relevance of human rights, right traditionalism has combined 
with left collectivism; allegedly communitarian third world societies are 
considered victims of an imperialist liberal agenda of human rights emanating 
from the Western-dominated United Nations. The concept of cultural rel- 
ativism is used by both traditionalists and communitarians as a defense of 
their "way of life" against the individualism and alienation that liberal human 
rights are thought to imply. But the relativism that is implicit in such arguments 
is actually a concept of cultural absolutism. 
Cultural absolutism is a philosophical position that declares a society's 
culture to be of supreme ethical value. It advocates ethnocentric adherence 
to one's own cultural norms as an ethically correct attitude for everyone 
except loosely-defined "Westerners." It thus posits particularist cultures as 
of more ethical value than any universal principle of justice. In the left-right/ 
North-South debate that permeates today's ideological exchanges, cultural 
absolutists specifically argue that culture is of more value than the inter- 
nationally-accepted (but Western in origin) principle of human rights. 
Human rights are considered in international law to be rights held equally 
by every individual by virtue of his or her humanity, and for no other reason. 
Human rights are non-derogable claims against both society and the state 
that are not contingent upon performance of specific duties. This article will 
Human Rights Quarterly 15 (1993) 315-338 o 1993 by The Johns Hopkins University Press 
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assume that defense of universal human rights is a worthwhile ethical position 
in the modern world. In complex state societies, human rights defend in- 
dividuals against political abuse. Most individuals would prefer for them- 
selves the protections that human rights offer, although they might not agree 
that others should have the same protections. 
A system of justice based on human rights is one particular system. There 
can be other systems of justice not based on human rights. In general, social 
justice can be defined as the means by which all members of a society are 
treated in a fashion considered respectful of their culturally defined social 
station. Justice consists of rules of appropriate social behavior and rules of 
fairness that might not contain the basic principles of human rights, namely 
that rights are individual and that everyone, regardless of status, is equally 
endowed with them. But some cultural relativists argue that all culturally- 
bound systems of social justice are human rights systems no matter what 
their substantive content or overarching principles. In making this claim, 
relativists undermine the actual meaning of human rights and leave the door 
open to severe abuses of individuals in the name of the rights of the col- 
lectivity or the community.' 
Because "human rights" is an ideologically and politically loaded phrase 
that has great moral cachet in contemporary world political debate, most 
political elites find it in their interests to pretend to believe in human rights. 
Spokespersons for a large number of societies whose systems of social justice 
are quite explicitly not based on human rights-that is, on the individual, 
autonomous capacity to make rights claims against society and the state- 
therefore contend that they do indeed have human rights: socialist, Muslim, 
Hindu, or other varieties thereof. They claim that sensitivity to the relativity 
of culture will result in acknowledgement that each culture has its own 
indigenous concept of human rights. 
Cultural relativism is a method "whereby social and cultural phenomena 
are perceived and described in terms of scientific detachment or, ideally, 
from the perspective of participants in or adherents of a given culture."2 This 
method of analysis evolved in the early twentieth century to counteract 
Westerners' nineteenth-century belief that their own white, Christian society 
was morally superior to all others. During the colonial period, belief in 
Western moral superiority justified anthropological study of "primitive" or 
"native" cultures, and anthropologists who clearly held to visions of white 
superiority abetted Western imperial conquest. Given the many attempts by 
Western powers to destroy indigenous societies, cultural relativism was and 
1. This discussion of social justice is from my "Dignity, Community and Human Rights," in 
Human Rights in Cross-Cultural Perspective: A Quest for Consensus, ed. Abdullahi A. An- 
Na'im (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1992), 81-102. 
2. David Bidney, "Cultural Relativism," in International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, 
ed. David L. Sills (New York: Macmillan, 1968), 3:543. 
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remains a valuable defense of indigenous societies against attack and de- 
struction by colonialists, missionaries, and others. 
Cultural relativism is not only a method, it is also an ethical stance. 
Relativism assumes that there is no one culture whose customs and beliefs 
dominate all others in a moral sense. But this relativism is now sometimes 
taken to such an extreme that any practice of an indigenous society can be 
theoretically defended merely on the grounds that it is a local "custom." 
And outsiders' discussions of local violations of human rights are criticized 
as unwarranted ideological interference. When taken to this absolutist ex- 
treme, the term "cultural relativism" implies that all cultures are morally or 
ethically equal, that there should be no judgements made of their compar- 
ative intrinsic worth. Jack Donnelly refers to this ethical position as "radical" 
cultural relativism, which holds that "culture is the sole source of the validity 
of a moral right or rule."3 Radical cultural relativism can be renamed cultural 
absolutism. 
The absolutist school claims, in effect, that human rights are not relevant 
to cultures that do not share "Western" customs, norms, beliefs, and values. 
Human rights are a notion culturally specific to the Western world. Different 
societies have different cultures that are not comparable. All cultures, more- 
over, are morally equal. Since cultures are not comparable, human rights 
are not and should not be universal, and no Westerner has the right to discuss 
ways that other cultures could or should reorient heir ethical systems. Human 
rights, in a now famous phrase, are a "Western construct with limited ap- 
plicability."4 
The absolutist argument against universal human rights has three sep- 
arate aspects. First, the absolutist argument confuses the principle of uni- 
versality with practice, which is clearly not universal. Universalism is un- 
tenable because in practice, human rights are not protected worldwide. For 
example, Pollis and Schwab, two leading relativists in the international 
human rights debate, noted in 1980 that human rights took second place 
to states' rights in many African countries and in socialist societies; they 
therefore concluded that what was not practiced was not relevant in prin- 
ciple.5 This position confuses the immediate existence of human rights with 
their possible legal and practical relevance. A medical analogy illustrates 
the illogical character of this argument; one would not argue that lack of 
access to health care in third world or socialist societies means health care 
is irrelevant. And in fact, the argument against universalism usually is made 
3. Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1989), 109. 
4. Adamantia Pollis and Peter Schwab, "Human Rights: A Western Construct with Limited 
Applicability," in Human Rights: Cultural and Ideological Perspectives, eds. Adamantia 
Pollis and Peter Schwab (New York: Praeger, 1980), 1-18. 
5. Ibid., 11. 
318 HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY Vol. 15 
with reference to civil and political rights, not to economic rights such as 
medical care. The fallacy of confusing practice and principle pervades a 
recent volume presenting a political economy critique of human rights in 
Africa. "[Flor countries that have known no peace, stability, or progress since 
their contact with the forces of Western imperialism, civil and political rights 
have no meaning."6 
Apparently, something that one lacks is not meaningful; one is not 
capable of speculating on what the quality of one's life would be if one had 
that which one lacked. But social movements for political change arise 
precisely because people do envisage a life in which more of their rights 
are protected. International human rights are a standard to which it would 
not be necessary to devote so much effort if they were already firmly protected 
everywhere. Those who advocate human rights as a universal principle do 
so precisely because rights are not universally respected. To claim that that 
which is not present is irrelevant assumes that those who are denied rights 
do not have the intellectual capacity to articulate their suffering and to grasp 
the fundamental principles of justice that human rights imply. Such a claim 
reinforces the stereotype of the "native" as a non-thinking, primitive being 
whose pain is part of the one-ness of his existence.7 
The second absolutist argument refers not to practice but to principle. 
Universal human rights are untenable because in principle, human rights 
are not a universal cultural ideal. This argument usually applies to the content 
of particular rights such as equality for women. "[T]he belief that women 
are entitled to equal status as citizens . . . is not universally accepted in 
African, Islamic or Western societies."8 
But cultural absolutists simultaneously argue that human rights are a 
universal ideal. The concept of rights is universal, but the content (what, 
substantively, are or ought to be rights) varies among different societies. All 
cultures, absolutists claim, have some ideals of human rights, although these 
ideals may seem strange to Western eyes since they do not include norms 
such as equality that are basic to the United Nations' human rights frame- 
work. Thus, for example, the Hindu caste system is proposed as a system 
of human rights. "The fact that certain groups [in India], the lower castes, 
for example, the untouchables, are denied human rights in no way proves 
6. Julius O. Ihonvbere, "Underdevelopment and Human Rights Violations in Africa," in 
Emerging Human Rights: the African Political Economy Context, eds. George W. Shepherd, 
Jr. and Mark O. C. Anikpo (New York: Greenwood Press, 1990), 57. 
7. Thus Isak Dinesen in Out of Africa (New York: Vintage Books, 1972 [1st ed. 19371), 278- 
83, who without any self-consciousness whatsoever, romanticized the stoicism of a "native" 
of her acquaintance as he awaited the death brought on by a beating by his colonial 
master. Ngugi wa Thiong'o, the Kenyan novelist, discusses Dinesen's perceptions of natives 
in his Detained: a Writer's Prison Diary (London: Heinemann, 1981), 35-36. 
8. Alison Dundes Renteln, "The Unanswered Challenge of Relativism and the Consequences 
for Human Rights," Human Rights Quarterly 7 (November 1985): 534. 
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that the society lacks a concept of human rights."9 This approach argues 
that all systems of social justice are systems of human rights. It is more 
important to give all systems of justice the ideologically pure label of human 
rights than to differentiate among such systems and discover which ones 
allocate substantive and equal rights and dignity to all individuals purely on 
the basis of their humanity, and which allocate only privileges and duties 
contingent on unequal social status. 
The third absolutist argument is that universalism is untenable because 
(it is argued implicitly) indigenous cultures supersede human rights as a 
social good. "[C]ultural relativism [absolutism] may be defined as the po- 
sition according to which local cultural traditions (including religious, po- 
litical, and legal practices) properly determine the existence and scope of 
civil and political rights enjoyed by individuals in a given society."'• This 
is the key to the absolutist perspective. For absolutists, culture is the supreme 
ethical value, more important than any other. Human rights, in particular, 
should not be promoted if their implementation might result in a change in 
a particular culture. 
But cultural absolutists do not fully reject universalist ethics as they claim 
to do. Cultural absolutists actually posit one universal ethical law, that 
a) there are no universal moral principles; 
b) one ought to act in accordance with the principles of one's own 
group; and 
c) (b) is a universal moral principle." 
This law carries more moral weight for absolutists than the law of universal 
human rights, although it is itself a principle that cannot be located in all 
cultural systems. If one were to look for it, one would probably find rather 
that most cultures believe that their own moral principles ought to be uni- 
versal. 
[Tmhe individual cannot but be convinced that his own way of life is the most 
desirable one.... [D]espite changes originating from within and without his 
culture that he recognizes as worthy of adoption, it becomes equally patent to 
him that, in the main, other ways than his own . . are less desirable .... .2 
Thus the logical position that most people embedded in their own cultures 
will take is: 
9. Ibid., 527. 
10. Fernando R. Teson, "International Human Rights and Cultural Relativism," Virginia Journal 
of International Law, 25 (Summer 1985): 870. 
11. Ibid., 888. 
12. This is taken from the classic "Statement on Human Rights," unsigned but known to be 
written by Melville Herskovitz, American Anthropologist, new series, 49 (Oct.-Dec. 1947): 
540. 
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a) there are universal moral principles; 
b) our own culture embodies these principles; and 
c) everyone else ought to follow our principles even if this means aban- 
doning his or her own culture. 
Thus, circumcised fight uncircumcised, Christians and Muslims slaughter 
each other, vegetarians despise meat-eaters, and so on all over the world. 
It is precisely because of each society's tendency to think its own culture 
the best that we need a basis for judging social justice that is not culture- 
bound. 
The third absolutist argument, that indigenous cultures supersede human 
rights as a moral good, is the major theme of a book by Alison Dundes 
Renteln, the most recent exemplar of the cultural absolutist school of human 
rights.13 Renteln believes that the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights was so heavily influenced by Western thought as to have no pertinence 
to non-Western societies; indeed, human rights are an ethnocentric value 
of Westerners. But simultaneously, she argues that in fact all societies do 
have their own human rights standards. In order to avoid ethnocentrism, 
she proposes that the only universal human rights standards be those em- 
pirically shown to be universal cultural ideals. Thus in practice Renteln does 
not completely reject universality. But she argues for additive, rather than 
ethical, universality: only a principle shown to be universal once we have 
looked for its presence or absence in all cultures is legitimate. The only 
principle that is universal on an ethical basis alone is that all societies ought 
to (ethnocentrically) adhere to their own culture. 
Renteln believes that one can discover human rights, or their "homeo- 
morphic equivalent"'4 in all societies. As an example of how to identify her 
universal homeomorphic equivalents, she uses the international legal pro- 
hibition of genocide. She reviews anthropological studies of retribution, 
feuds, and vendettas which, she argues, show that there are cultural rules 
of vengeance in most societies that limit the number of deaths permitted. 
This, Renteln contends, is evidence of a universal standard against genocide 
that is culturally entrenched, not dependent on a Western ethical norm. 
One can certainly accept Renteln's view that international human rights 
standards have a better chance of being put into practice if they also reflect 
cultural ideals. This is a position that the Muslim legal scholar Abdullahi 
Ahmed An-Na'im also espouses, in his search for Qur'anic justifications for 
equal rights for women, better treatment for religious minorities, and the 
end of the notion of jihad (holy war) as a basis for relations between Muslim 
13. Alison Dundes Renteln, International Human Rights: Universalism Versus Relativism (New- 
bury Park, CA: Sage, 1990). 
14. Ibid., 11. 
1993 Cultural Absolutism 321 
and non-Muslim states.'s But An-Na'im has been unable to find any internal 
Muslim precept that could be used to abolish the hudud punishments (am- 
putation of limbs for theft) presently used in his native Sudan.'6 This illustrates 
the difficulty of limiting ethical principles to those extant in particular cultural 
traditions, rather than acknowledging the legitimacy of abstract, philosoph- 
ical consideration of ethical questions that is transcultural and denies the 
preemptive claim of cultures to a superior moral status. 
In the world of cultural absolutism, ethical debate in universalist erms 
is simply not countenanced: particularist cultures are all-encompassing. But 
if culture is as all-encompassing as absolutists contend, it ought to be im- 
possible in practice for philosophers, lawyers, human rights activists, or 
indeed ordinary citizens within a society to transcend culture-boundedness 
or to make ethical judgments of their own customs. All we can do to promote 
universal human rights is to wait until cultures evolve internally, but not in 
reaction to the stimulus of thoughtful human agency. This flies in the face 
of all empirical evidence. Despite the cultural absolutists' belief that abstract, 
transcultural ethical discussions are impossible, all sorts of people insist on 
holding them. Cultural absolutists thereupon maintain that these discussions 
may not be impossible, but they are unethical. 
The Argentinean legal scholar Fernando R. Teson refers to the ideali- 
zation of culture as elitist. He disputes the position that 
. . . countries that do not spring from a Western tradition may somehow be 
excused from complying with the international law of human rights. This elitist 
theory ... holds that human rights are good for the West, but not for much of 
the non-Western world. [R]elativist [absolutist] scholars ... wish to respect the 
autonomy of individual cultures. The result is a vague warning against "eth- 
nocentrism" and well-intentioned proposals that are deferential to tyrannical 
governments and insufficiently concerned with human suffering. Because the 
consequence . . . is that certain national or ethnic groups are somehow less 
entitled than others to the enjoyment of human rights, the theory is fundamentally 
immoral and replete with racist overtones.17 
Moral discourse, contends Teson, is universalizable.18 Thus it is perfectly 
legitimate for a Westerner to advocate universal human rights and to discuss 
the possibilities for their protection worldwide. Human rights are about 
protection of people's lives, safety, and individual freedom. They are a 
15. Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, Towardan Islamic Reformation: Civil Liberties, Human Rights, 
and International Law (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1990). 
16. Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, "Toward a Cross-Cultural Approach to Defining International 
Standards of Human Rights: the Meaning of Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment," in Human Rights in Cross-Cultural Perspectives: A Quest for Consensus, 
note 1 above, 36. 
17. Teson, note 10 above, 895. 
18. Ibid., 889. 
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supreme universal value in the sense that most people, deprived of these 
protections, want to have them, regardless of the culture in which they live. 
"Unauthentic" third world thinkers who favor human rights should not be 
rejected as betrayers of traditional cultures. Without such "betrayal," their 
cultures may very well stultify in the hands of self-serving elites. 
II. AN ABSOLUTIST DEFENSE OF A WHITE CANADA 
The absolutist position maintains that human rights are a Western cultural 
imposition on the rest of the world. It posits a very crude understanding of 
what the "West" is and how culture and politics interact. It ignores the 
diversity of cultures within the West. It also confuses political philosophies 
with cultures, attributing one such philosophy, namely liberalism, to all 
Western societies and ignoring other Western philosophies such as com- 
munism, corporatism, and fascism that do not hold to human rights norms. 
Culturalist arguments are usually made with respect to the former col- 
onized nations of the world or to indigenous peoples in settler states. But 
to be consistent, culturalist arguments should also apply to large-scale, West- 
ern societies. All large-scale political units have internal cultures, although 
they may not be identified as such because internal conflicts and expressions 
of non-integrative particularist interests will be more obvious than in the 
small-scale, homogeneous communities that anthropologists have tradition- 
ally studied. If indigenous and third world cultures are to be allowed the 
complete play of their values, beliefs, norms, and customs regardless of 
whether or not they conform to international human rights standards, then 
the cultures of other societies should have the same privileges. Any society 
should be permitted to retain its culture regardless of human rights consid- 
erations. If absolutists reject this position then they are arguing that some 
cultures (in practice, indigenous third world ones) are more "absolute" than 
others; that some are absolutely worth preserving, whereas others can be 
changed or destroyed. They thus reverse the cultural imperialism that they 
contend characterizes the universal human rights documents, giving greater 
weight to non-Western than to Western ethical beliefs. 
If culture is a preemptive social good, with a higher moral standing than 
human rights, and if the only universal rule is that one ought to act in 
accordance with the principles of one's own group, then no cultural absolutist 
should find shocking the following argument about the nature of Canadian 
society. 
Canada is a white Protestant society of British origin (except Quebec). Its values 
are honesty, hard work, attachment to family, social rectitude, and loyalty to 
the monarchy. Canadians are a quiet people, not given to displays of emotion 
or unbridled festivities. They are sexually restrained. 
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Immigration to Canada must be very carefully controlled so that these values 
are not destroyed. People of Slavic or Latin origin have different social values 
than Northern Europeans-they tend to be noisier and less restrained, and have 
larger families. Jews are known to be merchants of questionable thics; they 
are not capable of real attachment to the land or to the monarchy. The Chinese 
and Japanese are good workers but their culture is incompatible with ours 
because they are neither British nor white, so they must not be allowed to stay 
in Canada except on short-term work permits. No decent Canadian would want 
to live in the same community as blacks, who are noisy, smelly, sexually un- 
restrained and criminal, so they should not be allowed to enter Canada either.19 
The above is a fair representation of dominant social attitudes in Canada 
until well into the 1950s. Many Canadians would contend that it is still an 
accurate representation of their society's cultural values today, and some 
would be willing to stop all further immigration of non-Europeans, indeed 
to send not only immigrants but also some native-born Canadians (partic- 
ularly blacks) "home." 
Preservation of white and Christian Canadian culture keeps the com- 
munity close, and promotes the security of its members by not exposing 
them to different people with different customs. As Michael Walzer has 
stated: 
[TMhe right to choose an admissions policy [to one's country] ... is not merely 
a matter of acting in the world, exercising sovereignty, and pursuing national 
interests. At stake here is the shape of the community that acts in the world, 
exercises sovereignty, and so on. Admission and exclusion are at the core of 
communal independence. They suggest the deepest meaning of self-determi- 
nation. Without them, there could not be communities of character, historically 
stable, ongoing associations of men and women with some special commitment 
to one another and some special sense of their common life.20 
Communities of character with a special sense of common life are a 
morally valuable social good. To belong to a community that shares your 
values, in which you feel at ease and in which everyday social intercourse 
is based on commonly acknowledged rules and customs is to find social 
life pleasant, rather than confusing or shocking. Canada is a typical Western 
society in so far as its immigration is carefully controlled to maintain its 
community of character in ways that, until very recently, violated interna- 
tional human rights norms. 
Canada has a long history of exclusion of non-white, non-Christian 
immigrants. Immigration policy has favored people of British or Northern 
19. This is not a quotation but my own summary of a position with which, obviously, I disagree. 
20. Michael Walzer, Spheres of ustice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality (New York: Basic 
Books, 1983), 61-62. 
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European origin. In 1914, a boatload of Sikhs attempting to immigrate into 
Canada via Vancouver was turned back.21 They were only one of many 
groups historically excluded. Chinese laborers were imported into Canada 
to build the Canadian National Railway, but once it was completed most 
of them were deported, and those few who were permitted to stay were not 
allowed to sponsor their wives and children into the country until well after 
World War II. Canada did not open its doors to refugee Jews during the Nazi 
period.22 Both non-citizen and citizen ethnic Japanese were subjected to 
mass internment during the Second World War.23 After the war, about 4,000 
citizens of Japanese ethnic descent were deported to Japan.24 The Chinese 
Immigration Act passed in 1923 in order to stop Chinese immigration was 
revoked in 1947,25 but the racial basis of Canada's immigration policy was 
not fully eliminated until 1967, when a non-racial point system based on 
wealth, occupation, education, and entrepreneurial abilities was adopted 
for independent immigrants not sponsored by family members already in 
Canada. By 1986 about five percent of the residents of Canada were of non- 
European, nonindigenous origin.26 
The result of the new criteria of immigration introduced in Canada in 
1967 is that most non-white immigrants are quite well educated and some 
groups, such as Koreans, Japanese and Indo-Pakistanis have higher per capita 
incomes than some Euro-Canadian ethnic groups such as Ukrainians, Por- 
tuguese, and Greeks.27 These non-white immigrants, known as "visible mi- 
norities," certainly do not conform to the previous image of Canada as a 
whites-only country (indigenous peoples having been regarded for decades 
as anomalous and irrelevant, if not inexorably doomed to extinction). Yet 
their aspirations and their lifestyles fit very closely with Canada's community 
of character. In most cases, the immigrants had fully adopted so-called 
"Canadian" values such as hard work, capital accumulation, and investment 
in home and family before they arrived in the country. They are also eager 
to adopt the Canadian social values of individual freedom of choice in 
21. The Canadian Encyclopedia (Edmonton: Hurtig, 1985), 2:948. 
22. Irving Abella and Harold Troper, None is Too Many: Canada and the Jews of Europe 1933- 
1948 (Toronto: Lester and Orpen Dennys, 1983). 
23. Ken Adachi, The Enemy that Never Was (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1976). 
24. Ellen Baar, "lssei, Nisei, and Sansei," in Modernization and the Canadian State, eds. Daniel 
Glenday, Hubert Guindon and Allan Turowetz (Toronto: Macmillan, 1978), 348. 
25. E. B. Wickberg, "Chinese," in The Canadian Encyclopedia (Edmonton: Hurtig, 1985), 
1:336. 
26. Calculated from Statistics Canada, The Nation: Ethnicity, Immigration and Citizenship 
(Canada Census, 1986) (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1989), 1-1, 1- 
14. European origins calculated by adding single and mixed origins. 
27. Conrad Winn, "The Socio-Economic Attainment of Visible Minorities: Facts and Policy 
Implications," in Social Inequality in Canada: Patterns, Problems, Policies, eds. James 
Curtis, Edward Grabb, Neil Guppy, and Sid Gilbert (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1988), 
197. Data based on 1981 census. 
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occupation, religion, and politics. Aside from skin color, they are distin- 
guished from Euro-Canadians only by language retention by first-generation 
immigrants and by some symbolic aspects of culture such as religion and 
ritual behavior. 
Nevertheless there has been a great deal of public hostility in Canada 
to the new non-white immigrants. During the 1970s, physical attacks on 
Asian immigrants were frequently reported; in Toronto, a Tanzanian was 
permanently crippled when he was pushed onto the subway rails.28 In the 
early 1980s, a major television news program broadcast an inflammatory 
report on how Chinese foreign students were taking up an inordinate number 
of places in the University of Toronto medical school; further investigation 
revealed that all of the people filmed were Canadian citizens of Chinese 
ethnic descent. In 1989-1990, public ire was aroused by a proposal that 
Sikhs in the Royal Canadian Mounted Police should be permitted to wear 
turbans. Many Canadians argued that to permit turbans would attack the 
prized tradition of the red Mountie jacket and broad-brimmed hat, and a 
petition of over 125,000 signatures opposing the change was presented to 
Parliament. Racist pins and calendars were produced in the Canadian West, 
including one calendar featuring a Sikh Mountie with the words "Sgt. Kamell 
Dung" written on it.29 The Prime Minister's statement that such objections 
resembled the behavior of the Ku Klux Klan annoyed many Canadians who 
defended "tradition" while asserting that they were not bigots.30 
That Canada's official non-racially based immigration policy arouses so 
much hostility and opposition is not surprising. For many Canadians of 
European extraction, community of character is possibly only among people 
who share the same "racial" characteristics, if not as well the same (Christian) 
religion. If culture is an absolute social value, then those who kept Canada 
closed to non-European and non-Christian immigrants for so long acted 
ethically. Those who pressured for Canada to open its doors undermined its 
culture and were unethical. They should have recognized that immigration 
threatened Canada's basic social values, its very culture as a society of 
descendants of British and Northern European Christian immigrants. The 
introduction of liberal, non-racist social values into Canadian public policy 
in the 1960s destroyed this previous cultural unity. 
Cultural absolutism is the antithesis of human rights. Positing culture as 
the highest social good, it permits, among many other human rights viola- 
tions, the exclusion of outsiders from the pure and inviolable community. 
This contradiction cannot be resolved by making the false claim that all 
28. "Racial Attacks Concern Toronto," Canadian News Facts 11 (19 Jan. 1977): 1699. 
29. "Prairie Backlash: Anti-minority Campaigns Cause Heated Debate," Maclean's, 19 March 
1990, 18-19. 
30. E.g., three out of five letters on this subject in The Spectator (Hamilton, Ontario), 28 March 
1990. 
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societies' systems of social justice are systems of human rights, even when 
they violate such basic tenets of human rights as the principle of nondis- 
crimination. The belief that all systems of social justice are equally good 
reflects both Western romanticism of primitive societies, and a collective 
social amnesia regarding the nefarious effects of romantic communitarianism 
in recent Western history. 
Ill. RELATIVISM, PRIMITIVISM, AND ROMANTICISM 
In traditional societies, principles of social justice are based not on equal 
human rights but on unequal social statuses and on the intermixture of 
privilege and responsibility. Cultural absolutists refer to the existence of such 
traditional societies to argue against any presumed universality of human 
rights. Often anthropologically anachronistic pictures are presented of pre- 
modern societies, taking no account whatsoever of changes that might have 
occurred. Pictures constructed by anthropologists of how societies might 
have behaved "before the white man came" are presented as accurate 
descriptions of how those societies still behave, decades if not centuries 
later. Yet the great anthropologist Claude Levi-Strauss actually had to per- 
suade the remnants of a tribe that he had set out to study to return to the 
bush with him, as they were just about to collectively join a Western set- 
tlement. Levi-Strauss was obliged to persuade his primitive community to 
stay primitive; his research plans were upset by the conscious decision his 
objects of study had taken to modernize.31 The use of anachronistic pictures 
of "native" societies to illustrate so-called cultural principles "airbrushes 
out" history.32 
Westerners often prefer that native societies be unchanging because of 
their belief that natives are their cultural ancestors. "Natives" represent a 
pure, idealized state of harmony and peace to which, someday, Westerners 
might return. In these societies, human rights are unnecessary because con- 
flict is unknown. The anxieties of modern civilization are not inevitable; 
they are a contingent accompaniment to modernity that Westerners may be 
able to eliminate if they can find the true path back to communal living. 
Yet the ethnographic studies on which cultural absolutists rely are not neutral, 
objective pictures. Contemporary anthropologists ympathetic to the cultures 
they study as are likely to overdraw their pictures as were their earlier, 
arrogantly colonialist forebears. Anthropological conclusions both about the 
31. Marianna Torgovnick, Gone Primitive: Savage Intellects, Modern Lives (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1990), 181. 
32. James Clifford, The Predicament of Culture: Twentieth Century Ethnography, Literature and 
Art (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1988), 202. 
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substance of cultural values and about the integrative, unchanging nature 
of cultural norms are drawn from highly questionable data that reflect both 
the arrogance and the romanticism of Western observers. 
Many of these pictures of indigenous cultures are a right-side up version 
of what Edward Said has called Orientalism. By Orientalism, Said refers to 
a pejorative view of the "Orient," or more particularly, of the Middle Eastern 
Islamic world. In the Orientalist perspective, the presentation of Islamic 
societies as unchanging, holistic entities is used pejoratively to suggest their 
incapacity to adapt to ethically superior modern ways. 
Islam is a unitary phenomenon, unlike any other [Western] religion or civili- 
zation. . . . [It is] monolithic, scornful of ordinary human experience, gross, 
reductive, unchanging.... [For Orientalists] there are still such things as an 
Islamic society, an Arab mind, an Oriental psyche.... "Arabs" are presented 
in the imagery of static, almost ideal types, and neither as creatures with a 
potential in the process of being realized nor as history being made." 
Cultural absolutists often present the inverse of Orientalism, not a pejorative 
picture of the societies they discuss but a complimentary, romanticized 
picture. In so doing, however, they use the same idiom of unchanging 
societies unaffected by human history. And they often attribute these char- 
acteristics to entire geographical regions or religions, as if a culture can be 
completely identified by its location or its religious beliefs. Said comments 
on this tendency to attribute cultural characteristics to entire regions of the 
world. 
"[Tihe Orient" is itself a constituted entity. . . . [T]he notion that there are 
geographical spaces with indigenous, radically "different" inhabitants who can 
be defined on the basis of some religion, culture, or racial essence proper to 
that geographical space is ... a highly debatable idea.34 
In academic discourse we no longer use racial stereotypes, yet in human 
rights debates commentators persist in stereotyping all the inhabitants of 
non-Western geographical regions with the religio-cultural beliefs that these 
commentators believe must define the non-Westerners' lives and dominate 
their thoughts. 
Many Westerners-explorers, anthropologists, culturally-sensitive ana- 
lysts of human rights--impose on the "traditional" societies they encounter 
their own desires to find a romantic, rustic original state in which social 
harmony prevails. This romanticization of "backward" or "primitive" cul- 
tures is a right-side-up Orientalism, not criticizing but idealizing. The ab- 
33. Edward W. Said, Orientalism (New York: Vintage Books, 1978), extracts from 296, 299, 
301, 321. Emphasis in original. 
34. Ibid., 322. 
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solutist denial of universal human rights revels in the romantic mysticism of 
primitive society. 
The relativist [absolutist] ... often defines the interests of a people in mystical 
or aggregative terms that ignore or belittle individual preferences. Such mystical 
definitions may be articulated inthe form of axiomatic "true" interests of peoples, 
as opposed to real or expressed interests." 
Cultural absolutism then is a spinoff of Western primitivism, the simul- 
taneous idealization and denigration of the "primitive" that has characterized 
Western culture since the mid-nineteenth century. Primitivism as an ideal 
began with the early European explorations to such remote places as "darkest 
Africa" where, it was thought, man was his true natural self, at one with 
nature. "Primitives are mystics, in tune with nature, part of its harmonies. 
Primitives are free."36 Contemporary idealization of third world cultures is 
a new version of that same trend. 
Denial of the individuality of members of these societies merges them 
into one amorphous whole, in which cultures are at risk of being destroyed 
(for example by introducing new norms of human rights) but actual people 
are not. When the people who comprise these romanticized cultures are 
considered not real individuals with their own needs, wants, and desires 
but rather living anthropological exhibits, then their human rights can go 
unheeded. The primitive by definition is natural and cannot have the socially 
constructed desires for human rights that Westerners have as refined, alien- 
ated social beings. The primitive is not capable of abstract thought, of step- 
ping out of her environs to consider the nature of social life or the ethics of 
her group. Thus to introduce the ideal of human rights even into verbal 
discourse with a primitive is to be an imperialist, to set off a process of social 
change that may well wreck the indigenous social order. 
That Westerners themselves might once have been primitives whose 
societies underwent centuries of social change is of no consequence here. 
Those primitive societies that still exist are taken to be our psychological 
ancestors. We need their existence, even when their social organization may 
well be exploitative of, or cruel to, many of their members so that we can 
have a mythic past of purity. Their organic wholeness, their oneness with 
nature, their repression of individual choice appeals to a Western desire for 
an imagined simpler world. Primitives are communitarians par excellence, 
unpolluted by ideas of individualism or competition. In their societies, no 
one questions the rules; everyone, even the lowliest, lives in harmony with 
others and with authority. Thus the appeal of the primitive not only to left 
romantics, but also to right traditionalists. 
35. Teson, note 10 above, 882. 
36. Torgovnick, note 31 above, 8. 
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IV. COMMUNITARIAN VERSUS INDIVIDUALIST 
PERSPECTIVES ON SOCIETY 
The cultural absolutist critics of universal human rights look for a world that 
no longer exists, if it ever did: a world of community, of integrative mem- 
bership of the individual in the group, and of a wholeness and unity with 
nature. Absolutists' defense of indigenous cultures against universalized hu- 
man rights is to a large extent a consequence of their concern that human 
rights will encourage the emergence of an individualized, atomistic, and 
competitive social world. Absolutists idealize the third world community, 
which exemplifies for Western culture the primitive arcadia we have lost, 
even as the third world displays some of the worst human rights abuses of 
early modernization. 
In the absolutist perspective, the preservation of the corporate entity of 
the community will do more to preserve human rights than introduction of 
the principle that the individual may make claims against society and the 
state. This corporate community, a product of over two hundred years of 
romantic reaction to the individualizing and liberating tendencies of modern 
capitalist society, is completely unproblematic. In its romantic rendering, 
internal inequities, power relationships, and brutalities disappear in a foggy 
haze of mythological collectivity. The "traditional" way of life beckons to 
our anxious citified psyches, reminding us all of the pristine collective origins 
from which we spring. 
Individuals living in primitive, pre-capitalist communitarian societies are 
not permitted to change or to think about what they would like from life. 
Certainly, they are not permitted to deny our dream of Utopia by adopting 
Western artifacts or ideas. The Tasaday of the Philippines, for example, were 
accused by anthropologists of being fake primitives when they started to 
wear blue jeans and eat cheese crackers.37 In a similar vein, the contemporary 
primitives of third world societies are not permitted to be attracted to, to 
adopt or advocate, individualist ideals of personal autonomy or human rights. 
Those individuals from the third world who do express such ideas are quickly 
dismissed as "Westernized;" that is, as unauthentic, offending our view of 
the psychological role they play for us. "[Ilt is critical to realize that the 
Western-based notions of human rights, to the extent that they are articulated 
by third world political elites, reflect these elites' 'Westernization.' "38 While 
we value intellectual independence in our own tradition we refuse it to 
intellectuals in others; they are supposed to be conservative exemplars, not 
radical challengers, of their own traditional values. 
The anti-individualist trend of the traditionalist nostalgia for community 
37. Ibid., 259 n.58. 
38. Pollis and Schwab, note 4 above, 12. 
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harbors a romantic tendency to ignore or disguise the many repressive and 
harmful effects (from a human rights perspective) of communitarian societies. 
This nostalgic discourse pits the allegedly alienated individualism of late 
twentieth century capitalist society against the supposed security and per- 
sonal rootedness of life in the collectivity. It ignores the liberating aspects 
of individualism and forgets that collectivities can be highly oppressive social 
entities. 
Communitarians and individualists have radically different perspectives 
on the value of social life in the two types of societies. Those who favor 
communitarian society value the fact that within it one's ties are prescribed 
by one's relations to family and kin. Within that network of ties, sex and 
age roles are carefully defined and androgynous life choices (stepping over 
the boundaries of male and female roles) unheard of. Deviance is universally 
abhorred and punished. Communitarians abhor the fact that in individualist 
society, by contrast, androgyny is permitted and "lifestyle" choices that 
offend the natural order of kinship and family are tolerated. In the com- 
munitarian perspective, individualists who reject family ties have no other 
ones and consequently feel anomie-a disconnection from society-and 
normlessness. 
In the communitarian perspective, socially-prescribed roles, freely ful- 
filled, are assumed to result in rootedness in society. Such rootedness cannot 
exist for the presumably alienated Western individual, who experiences the 
confusion of having to make autonomous choices about how to live his or 
her life. Individualist society exhibits a free-for-all tolerance of disruptive, 
anomic deviance which carries with it a disregard for the actual conse- 
quences of deviant acts. The individualist adrift in a sea of normlessness, 
casting about for new rules to regulate his life, is confused and alienated 
from society, while his communitarian counterpart is firmly rooted in his 
social group. 
For communitarians, social stratification is a sensible allocation of roles. 
Although honor is based on rank, there is no shame attached to those who 
are slotted into lesser positions as long as they fulfil their prescribed tasks 
with diligence. Caste distinctions are acceptable and all castes, including 
slaves, cooperate for the greater good of the whole community. Thus there 
is an underlying equality of respect. In individualist society, by contrast, 
those inherently deserving of respect, such as the aged or the priests and 
lawmakers, are frequently denied it. Ascribed caste distinctions give way to 
unpredictable class distinctions arising from unregulated competition for 
wealth and prestige; the "fittest" dominate by ignoring their obligations to 
others. The social whole breaks down into an anarchical system, in which 
neither respect nor economic security can be guaranteed even to those who 
dutifully fulfil their obligations to family, kin and society. 
Thus individualism challenges the routine and valued orderliness of 
communitarian society. Upstarts abound, people abandon their social roles, 
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honor disappears. Quiet communitarian life gives way to normative and 
social chaos. 
In the communitarian view, the underlying glue that holds society to- 
gether is its culture. The culture tends to be static and orderly; very little 
change is foreseen. One's primary identity comes from one's family or kin, 
then from larger social structures uch as one's unchanging group, defined 
as ethnic, religious, or national. There is no social conflict within this group; 
rather, everyone accepts its rules and roles. Implicitly, the communitarian 
view denigrates social deviance and the stepping outside of social roles that, 
for example, women's liberation and the black civil rights movement have 
permitted in the Western world. Instead, it is assumed that contentedness 
comes from fitting into the group. It is also assumed that members of such 
closed corporate groups can and do live together in mutual tolerance when 
not rent by the selfish claims of individualistic deviants. 
The individualist view of the antithesis between communitarian and 
individualist society is quite different. It stresses the repressive, discriminatory 
features of the ideologized communitarian society. In its view, prescribed 
family and kin ties are repressive or, indeed, demeaning and violent, as in 
the case of patriarchal violence against women and children. The social 
individual, therefore, ought to be free to choose other social networks that 
may be more important to her than family or kin. In individualist society no 
one is locked into traditional, prescribed social roles: sex roles can be ignored 
and deviance from traditional ways of life is permitted. 
Individualists perceive the belongingness of closed social groups to 
encourage racial or ethnic exclusivism, while a more open society encour- 
ages real tolerance of others whatever their racial, ethnic or other ascriptive 
affiliations. In individualist society, a person must form an autonomous sense 
of herself, which may or may not result in a conscious decision to obey the 
social norms prescribed by tradition. Individual achievement is celebrated, 
while categorization of people on the basis of nonautonomous traits having 
nothing to do with personal achievement is viewed as degrading. 
In the individualist world, respect must be earned; one is not entitled 
to it merely by virtue of one's rank. Shame is just as much a characteristic 
of communitarian society as honor; to be respected because one fills one's 
lowly position without complaint is in fact to suffer from permanent dishonor. 
No hierarchies of status exist in the individualist world; indeed, there are 
no inherent statuses at all. The unhealthy social regulation of traditional 
society is replaced by a healthy competition in which the best rise to the 
top solely on the basis of their own efforts. Individualists see social uniformity 
of communitarian society as repressive. Thus in the individualist view, change 
permits diversity, the rise and fall of individuals as their capacities dictate, 
the choice and evolution of new communities and new ways of living, the 
end of all inherent status rankings. A society in flux is a society that is 
progressing. 
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These schematized ideal types do not represent real societies. Individ- 
ualist societies contain many communitarian features. And as communitarian 
societies change, they approach the individualist model in culture as well 
as in politics and economics. Both in practice and in theory, we need to 
reconcile the communitarian and the individualist account of society. The 
communitarian account is too critical of the breakdown of community and 
tends to refer back to romanticized models, while the individualist account 
is too uncritical of the costs of individualism. The polarization of these two 
accounts of ideal society prevents discussion of the human rights abuses 
that exist in both and that an uncritical defense of "culture," whether closed 
and traditional or open and competitive, can generate. 
V. CULTURAL ABSOLUTISM AND THE CONSERVATIVE R ACTION 
The absolutist critique trumpets the right to community over individual hu- 
man rights, but only for people in other societies for whom critical and 
abstract thought is unauthentic. Thus in the culturally differentiated third 
world the individual loses her capacity to claim fulfillment of her human 
rights from the state or society; she renounces her human rights for the 
greater good of the collectivity. This renunciation is costless to her because 
her identity is merged with that of the group, so that human rights on an 
individual basis would seem not only irrelevant, but laughable. She is merged 
with her family and society in an organic oneness that fulfills both her creative 
and her social needs. And of course, since in this rendering she either does 
not live in a state or class society or is untouched by the state's or the ruling 
class' political and economic interests, she is entirely without need for the 
classic civil and political rights. 
In the communitarian view of individualist rights-protective society, 
autonomy is seen as alienation. Pollis, for example, refers to the Western 
view of man as an "isolated, autonomous" creature.39 Autonomy, however, 
does not necessarily mean alienation from the community. Autonomy does 
mean that the individual makes decisions for herself and may well refuse 
socially prescribed roles in favor of other roles that seem preferable. The 
autonomous individual in Western society is frequently one who is connected 
to the community through freely chosen associations and friendships, as 
well as through continued family ties. Autonomously formed groups, sub- 
cultures, and neighborhoods abound in Western culture. The autonomous 
individual is not necessarily an alienated individual; she can rather be the 
39. Adamantia Pollis, "Liberal, Socialist and Third World Perspectives on Human Rights," in 
Toward a Human Rights Framework, eds. Peter Schwab and Adamantia Pollis (New York: 
Praeger, 1982), 7. 
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"public man [person]," actively involved in the community and participating 
in political decisions.40 The decline of publics into masses, or the transfor- 
mation of independent citizens into manipulable robots, is not a necessary 
consequence of individualism. 
This does not mean that the tension between individual and community 
does not need to be examined. The unbridled individualism and materialism 
that became characteristic of some sectors of the North American population 
in the 1970s and 1980s is an antisocial phenomenon. It is not accidental 
that the worst excesses of individualism are found in the United States, where 
economic human rights in particular carry very little weight. The culture of 
late twentieth century North America celebrates freely-chosen, individual- 
istic lifestyles. But "lifestyles" can be a matter of choice only for those in 
an economic position to choose; for many if not most people, the substantive 
realities of economic insecurity preclude any capacity to choose a particular 
individualist style of living even in Western society. 
While autonomy and choice free individuals from often abusive social 
constraints, competition results in a lack of responsibility for others. To base 
respect solely on what is earned, rather than to respect people merely because 
as human beings with thoughts, feelings, and souls they deserve respect, 
casts many onto the dungheap of capitalism. The ideology of achievement 
now permits societal disregard of those who have not achieved, or who 
cannot achieve, given the historic disabilities under which they labor. While 
communities thrive in many areas of North America, in other areas collective 
responsibility for social welfare has disappeared via white flight, tax revolt, 
and vulgar display of personal wealth. 
Community is destroyed in modern societies where the individualist 
pursuit of wealth is the primary social value, and where the poor are sys- 
tematically disregarded. The unbridled individualism typical of some sectors 
of the North American population is an indication that human rights are not 
being protected. Modern societies can be communities when the entire range 
of human rights-economic, social, and cultural as well as civil and polit- 
ical-is respected. In wealthy societies, such respect is certainly possible in 
practice, though it may be anathemic in principle to some sectors of such 
wealthy societies. Unbridled materialistic individualism is a strong argument 
for taking seriously the economic human rights upon which (in their rhetoric) 
socialist and third world countries have insisted in international debate. But 
it is not an argument for reducing autonomy, reimposing communitarian 
controls that limit individual choices, or eliminating the principle that in- 
dividuals may make claims for their human rights on society and the state. 
40. Robert N. Bellah, Richard Madsen, William M. Sullivan, Ann Swidler, and Steven M. 
Tipton, Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1985). 
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Arguments for the absolute value of culture and for the importance of 
the petrified community over the individual result in political conservatism. 
The cultural absolutist approach to human rights has real political impli- 
cations. If we are to accept that the community is more valuable than the 
individual and that culture must be preserved even at the expense of human 
rights, then we must discuss the question of priorities. When, as frequently 
happens, community norms, rules, or desires clash with individual rights, 
what will take precedence? The new communitarianism likes to pretend that 
these clashes do not occur, but they do. Communitarianism denies the 
existence of status degradation and oppression within all societies. The 
romanticization of "primitive" and "traditional" societies by relativist and 
third worldist critics exacerbates this trend. 
The romantic communitarianism that some Western absolutists now 
propound as a legitimate argument against individual human rights also 
ignores the Western world's own history. In 1993, we are fewer than fifty 
years past the worst excesses of romantic communitarianism the world has 
ever seen. National Socialism glorified the collectivity over the individual, 
and built up a myth of a pre-Christian (non-Judaic) past in which; supposedly, 
a community of Aryan beings lived in close communion with nature. "In 
the beginning, the 'New Order' appeared as an instant solution to the quest 
of the masses for social dignity and a renewed community spirit."41 Nazism 
epitomized the underlying tendencies of Western culture to retreat from 
secularism, liberalism, and humanism into a romanticized past of order, 
stability, unchanging social roles, and complete social homogeneity. 
The [romantic] German Weltanschauung ... [was] a total view of the (natural 
and social) world, fundamentally in conflict with the essentially humanist and 
rationalist thought typical of the rest of Western civilization. ... [The] personal 
"individualism" of the early Romantics very soon became transformed into an 
organic and nationalistic theory of community, each unique and self-sufficient, 
according to which . . . the individual was "fated to merge with and become 
rooted in nature and the Volk" and would thus be "able to find his self-expression 
and his individuality." Moreover, individuality was ascribed no longer merely 
to persons, but to supra-personal forces, especially the nation or the state.42 
The revival of romantic communitarianism without adequate consid- 
eration of its potential for social corporatism, if not indeed renewed fascism, 
may well undermine the secularist, liberal, and humanitarian tradition of 
human rights that has provided some protections to deviants, outsiders, 
despised groups, and the oppressed over the past 200 years. The Nazis 
41. Christa Kamenetsky, "Political Distortion of Philosophical Concepts: a Case History- 
Nazism and the Romantic Movement," Metaphilosophy 3 (July 1972): 216. 
42. Steven Lukes, Individualism (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1973), 19-21. His quotations are 
from G. L. Mosse, The Crisis of German Ideology (London, 1966), 15. 
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murdered Jews because they regarded them as modern, cosmopolitan, root- 
less slime.43 They persecuted homosexuals because they denied their pre- 
scribed sex roles and their obligations to the German family, exhibiting, 
especially during the Weimar Republic, a free, autonomously chosen, and 
deviant lifestyle.44 They debated whether to preserve the Gypsies as eth- 
nographic museum specimens of the noble savage or to kill them as unauth- 
entic half-breeds, finally choosing the latter course."4 In the Nazi mind, Jews 
and homosexuals epitomized selfish commercialism and individualism: 
Gypsies symbolized the worst impurities of contact between modernity and 
the primitive. 
There appears to be a collective amnesia in the international human 
rights literature, an unstated agreement to no longer speak of fascism. We 
have forgotten that fascist ideology was rooted in a romantic notion of an 
abandoned communitarian past. We now prefer to dwell only on the 
"good"-peaceful, loving, accepting, mutually tolerant--aspects of com- 
munity that are relevant to the current critiques of liberalism. Fascism, we 
seem to believe, can't happen again; no contemporary society would turn 
its community inward to the extent that the Nazis did. 
Yet like the cultural underpinnings of most other societies, the cultural 
underpinnings of Western society do not all favor human rights. Human 
rights are an ideal emanating from certain strands of Western political phi- 
losophy, mainly liberalism and social democracy. These strands in their turn 
are in part occasioned by social changes in the modern capitalist period 
that generated secularism and humanism. The politically dominant cultural 
values of some Western countries may possibly mesh with the values of 
human rights in the 1990s, after forty-five years of pro-human rights prop- 
aganda and some real progress in law and practice. But even in the West, 
the values of human rights are tenuous and fragile. A far stronger case can 
be made that human rights are not the dominant Western cultural tradition 
than that they are. The Western philosophical and cultural traditions of social 
justice include not only liberalism, but also communism, corporatism, ra- 
cism, and fascism. 
The absolutist perspective meshes culture with tradition and with the 
past. It ignores the existence in the third world of disparate political regime 
types and the repressive philosophies that many espouse. But cultures in the 
twentieth century are very much determined by the capacities of political 
elites to influence values through the educational system, the mass media, 
43. On Jews as slime, see Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust (Ithaca, N.Y.: 
Cornell University Press, 1989), 39. 
44. Richard Plant, The Pink Triangle: The Nazi War Against Homosexuals (New York: Henry 
Holt, 1986). 
45. Donald Kenrick and Grattan Puxon, The Destiny of Europe's Gypsies (London: Heinemann, 
1972), 93. 
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and political incorporation. We are not our ancestors, either our mythic, 
pre-historic ancestors or our immediate ones. Every individual and every 
cultural group is now influenced by a central state apparatus adhering to 
one or another political ideology. To espouse cultural absolutism as if these 
political regimes do not exist is, in effect, to espouse political relativism and 
to argue that all regime types possess ethically equal "cultures" of human 
rights. 
Romantic communitarianism now buttresses many of the criticisms of 
liberal individualism made by political regimes on both the left and the right. 
On the left, the discredited communist criticism of human rights as bourgeois 
and individualist was picked up in the 1970s by third world spokespersons 
who still sometimes argue that their traditional communities have no room 
for individual claims against society or the state. On the right, the 1980s 
witnessed the spectacle of President Ronald Reagan of the United States 
extolling the virtues of traditional family life. Although his own life was one 
of freewheeling disregard for his children,46 he managed to indict liberalism 
as the major social force behind the American destruction of the family, 
ignoring how his own public policy measures contributed to that destruc- 
tion.47 
Liberalism in North America is overly individualistic. Some aspects of 
community have disappeared and some types of community, especially a 
community of whites and blacks, never existed. But these problems cannot 
be rectified by recourse to the myth of a golden arcadian past. Romanticizing 
non-Western societies as embodiments of the values that we have lost, or 
never had, does not solve our problems; it merely obscures theirs.48 
Reliance on myths of communal living avoids discussion of serious 
ethical questions of how to ensure justice in the contemporary world. That 
much of the world was recently subjected to Western imperialism does not 
mean that it is now exempt from international ethical debate. Those who 
work for change within their own societies, and those who suffer both modern 
state-generated brutality and traditional rights abuses, are done a disservice 
by some Westerners' willingness to dismiss such suffering as culturally au- 
thentic, thus impervious to criticism from other cultural (philosophical, po- 
litical) traditions. 
Serious critical analysis of the human rights abuses that exist in non- 
Western parts of the world does not necessarily imply imperialist policy 
recommendations. To criticize another society or political system because 
46. Joan Didion, "Life at Court," New York Review of Books 36, no.20 (21 Dec. 1989): 3 
passim. 
47. On how public policy neglects the family in the United States, see Sylvia Ann Hewlett, A 
Lesser Life: the Myth of Women's Liberation in America (New York: Warner Books, 1986). 
48. On how we never had some of these values, see Peter Laslett, The World We Have Lost- 
Further Explored, 3rd ed. (London: Methuen, 1983). 
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human rights abuses are intrinsic to its practices is not to advocate that one's 
own society should therefore take it over and rearrange matters. Contem- 
porary human rights advocates are not the equivalent of nineteenth-century 
Christian missionaries; that their principles are sometimes coopted by self- 
serving political rhetoric does not mean that they are the de facto agents of 
their governments. Nor does ethical criticism of a society, whether one's 
own or others', imply that one regards all of its culture as unworthy. Many 
human rights-abusive practices that do exist are not intrinsic to the culture; 
rather they are consequences of economic or political interest. 
Many critics of universal human rights from less-developed societies 
want to preserve their social values and are afraid that human rights will 
undermine them. But many aspects of culture, such as kinship patterns, art, 
or ritual, have nothing to do with human rights and can safely be preserved, 
even enhanced, when other rights-abusive practices are corrected. These 
include many aspects of public morality. The existence or abolition of po- 
lygynous marriage, for example, is not an international human rights issue, 
despite feminist objections to it in the West. Nor is the proper degree of 
respect one should show to one's elders, or the proper norms of generosity 
and hospitality. The apparent Western overemphasis on work at the expense 
of family is a cultural practice that third world societies can avoid without 
violating human rights. Many other such matters, such as whether criminal 
punishment should be by restitution or imprisonment, or whether homo- 
sexuals should have the right to ordination, can be resolved without violating 
international human rights norms. 
Cultural absolutism forgives cruelty on the grounds that acting in ac- 
cordance with the customs of one's own group is a universal moral principle. 
The actual values of various groups are brought to our attention when they 
seem to be universally "good," as in Renteln's highlighting of tendencies to 
limit retribution in small-scale societies, even though principled universality 
is rejected and only additive universality is accepted. But when the principles 
of such groups would seem to be "bad," when they condone denial of food 
to the weak or denial of respect to those ritually impure, they are ignored. 
Thus can non-Western societies be romanticized. In our longing for the 
good, we overlook evil, and claim we are doing so in the name of non- 
imperialist relativism. Culture is the absolute value, and individual suffering 
is lost in its embrace. 
Cultural absolutists are the real ethnocentrists. They not only argue that 
no one's sense of justice can transcend the boundaries of her own culture, 
they also argue that one ought not to transcend them. When dealing with 
the underdeveloped world, abstract discussion of norms of human rights 
that do not reflect one's cultural embeddedness is a form of cultural betrayal. 
Nevertheless, the West is expected to adhere to such abstract notions when 
in contact with the rest of the world. It is expected to compensate for its 
past colonial depredations, act in a non-racist manner both in its international 
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and its domestic politics, and respect others' cultures. This is a double 
standard. Cultural absolutists applaud ethnocentrism in underdeveloped so- 
cieties, yet they expect the West to behave in ways that respect human rights 
and thereby do not adhere to its own cultural norms. And they consider the 
standards of human rights to which some Westerners and some thinkers and 
activists from the third world want their own society to adhere to be cultural 
impositions or imperialism. This denies to citizens of the underdeveloped 
world the right to use their reason to consider transcendent ethical norms 
which, if implemented in their own societies, might well result in the bet- 
terment of their own lives. 
